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Abstract
Communication and privacy are two critical concerns in distributed learning. Many existing works
treat these concerns separately. In this work, we argue that a natural connection exists between methods
for communication reduction and privacy preservation in the context of distributed machine learning. In
particular, we prove that Count Sketch, a simple method for data stream summarization, has inherent
differential privacy properties.1 Using these derived privacy guarantees, we propose a novel sketch-based
framework (DiffSketch) for distributed learning, where we compress the transmitted messages via
sketches to simultaneously achieve communication efficiency and provable privacy benefits. Our evaluation
demonstrates that DiffSketch can provide strong differential privacy guarantees (e.g., ε = 1) and reduce
communication by 20-50× with only marginal decreases in accuracy. Compared to baselines that treat
privacy and communication separately, DiffSketch improves absolute test accuracy by 5%-50% while
offering the same privacy guarantees and communication compression.
1 Introduction
Communication costs and privacy concerns are two critical challenges in performing distributed machine
learning with sensitive information. Indeed, these challenges are particularly relevant for the increasingly
common problem of federated learning, in which data is collected and stored across a network of devices such
as mobile phones or wearable devices [29, 34]. Communicating data across such a distributed network in
order to learn an aggregate model is both costly and can potentially reveal sensitive user information [10, 35].
Many prior efforts have separately considered communication or privacy in distributed machine learning. For
example, common strategies to reduce the size of messages sent across the network include sparsification,
quantization, or subsampling [25]. Previous privacy-preserving methods typically add noise to guarantee
differential privacy [35], or use cryptographic protocols such as secure multi-party computation (SMC) [6].
While these approaches are effective at either reducing communication or protecting privacy independently,
the two goals are largely treated as orthogonal to one another. As we demonstrate, this can be problematic
when aiming to achieve both private and efficient learning, as using a direct combination of the above
techniques [e.g., 3] can significantly degrade overall accuracy (§5.2).
In this work, we argue that the goals of communication reduction and privacy protection are closely related,
and show that leveraging this relation has significant benefits for distributed learning. Intuitively, both tasks
1We note that the definition of local differential privacy used in our work is weaker than the standard local privacy definition.
In addition, we are aware of some issues with our current proof of the differential privacy properties of Count Sketch. We are
currently working on a revision of this draft.
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share an aim to reduce, mask, or transform information sent across the network in a way that preserves
the underlying learning task. While this connection has been observed in other settings [45, 47], we are not
aware of other work that formalizes these connections and optimizes both goals in the context of distributed
machine learning.
In particular, we identify sketching algorithms (sketches) as a natural tool to jointly consider communication
and privacy in distributed learning. Sketches use independent hash functions to compress the input data with
bounded errors, and have well-studied trade-offs between space and accuracy [4, 11, 14]. While sketches have
previously been used to reduce communication in distributed networks [23], we show that by randomizing
the data with independent hash functions, sketches can in fact also provide privacy for free, as they have
provable differential privacy benefits (§3). More specifically, we demonstrate that sketches can be used to
achieve local differential privacy [17, 44] in distributed machine learning—a setting where we do not assume
a trusted central server and the central server cannot see individual model updates.
Based on our derived privacy guarantees, we introduce DiffSketch, a framework built upon canonical
sketches such as Count Sketch [11] to jointly optimize communication and privacy in distributed learning.
While we explore DiffSketch in the context of distributed machine learning, we note that it is general in that
it could potentially be applied to any task that requires estimating the mean of a set of distributed vectors.
Empirically, we verify the communication reduction and privacy benefits of DiffSketch for applications with
both distributed SGD and FedAvg, a popular method for federated learning [34]. Our results demonstrate
that by considering communication and privacy jointly, DiffSketch can deliver 5%-50% improvements in
terms of absolute test accuracy compared with baselines for fixed levels of privacy and communication.
Contributions2. In this work, we provide the first differential privacy guarantees of Count Sketch with-
out additional mechanisms (§3). Based on these derived privacy guarantees, we design DiffSketch, a
communication-efficient and differentially-private distributed learning framework using Count Sketch as a
building block (§4). Our evaluation demonstrates that DiffSketch offers strong privacy guarantees and
communication reduction benefits with significantly improved accuracy compared to baselines (§5).
2 Related Work and Background
Communication-efficient learning. Communication is a key bottleneck in distributed learning, and has
been studied extensively in classical distributed (e.g., data center) computing as well as emerging applications
of federated learning. A common approach to reducing communication is to limit the size of messages
sent across the network using various compression methods [e.g., 8, 23, 25]. This is particularly useful for
applications such as deep learning, where the messages sent are similar in size to the model and can thus
be quite large. As we show in this work, compression methods such as sketching are related to the goals of
privacy preservation, but are typically explored in isolation.
A second, orthogonal approach to communication-efficiency is to reduce the total number of communication
rounds in training by developing flexible and efficient distributed optimization methods [34, 39, 40, 41,
43]. While not the focus of this work, we explore our framework in conjunction with one such canonical
communication-efficient optimization method, FedAvg [34], in §4.
2We note that a preliminary version of our vision appeared in [33], where we suggested the promise of using sketching to
enhance privacy in federated learning. However, in this preliminary work we did not prove any differential privacy guarantees of
sketches, propose a distributed learning framework to capitalize on the connection, or explore the privacy benefits empirically.
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Privacy in distributed learning. In a variety of distributed learning scenarios handling user-generated
data, privacy has become increasingly important to consider. Indeed, privacy concerns can even motivate
the need for distributed learning—for example, privacy is a key motivation in federated learning, as it
necessitates that raw user data remain local and thus distributed across the network [34]. There are two
common approaches to preserve privacy in distributed settings, based either on statistical or cryptographical
foundations. The first is to provide differential privacy by adding random perturbations (e.g., random noise
drawn from a Gaussian or Laplacian distribution) to the output of a function [2, 3, 27, 35]. In distributed
contexts, it is common to think of differential privacy as either being enforced in a “local” or “global” sense
depending on whether the server is a trusted party. We provide more formal definitions of differential privacy
in §3.1, and demonstrate that our framework, DiffSketch, is able to achieve strong local differential privacy
guarantees via sketches.
Another line of work is based on cryptography, including secure multiparty computation (SMC) [6, 12, 21].
SMC protects users’ privacy by encrypting individual inputs such that multiple parties can jointly compute
a function without learning about the input information from any party. However, cryptographic-based
approaches are not well-suited to distributed learning, as they can incur significant communication and
computation overheads [5]. In general, these types of privacy-preserving methods tend to increase the
communication cost in distributed settings.
Connections between communication and privacy. Some recent works have explored connections
between communication compression and privacy [45, 47]. However, they focus on much simpler settings such
as multiplicative database transformation [47], or transmitting raw data in sensor networks [45], and can only
preserve limited information such as the covariance of the original data [47]. Duchi and Rogers [16] explore an
equivalence between estimation under privacy constraints and estimation under communication constraints,
but for different purposes of developing lower bounds to showcase the fundamental limitations of differential
privacy. We explore such connections in distributed learning both theoretically and empirically through
sketching, and demonstrate that DiffSketch achieves competitive accuracy with guaranteed differential
privacy and convergence (§5). Finally, recent work called cpSGD [3] proposes modifications to distributed
SGD to make the method both private and communication-efficient. However, the authors treat these as
separate issues, and develop different approaches to address each within cpSGD. In §5 we compare directly with
cpSGD and demonstrate that by separately reducing communication and enforcing privacy, errors in cpSGD
are compounded; by instead considering these jointly, DiffSketch provides substantially higher accuracy.
Sketches. Sketching algorithms (sketches) provide approximate estimates of different statistics (such as
computing the distinct count or average) over a dataset, and have been widely used in streaming data
processing [4, 15, 37], databases [11, 13, 14], and network measurement [31, 32, 46]. Recently sketches have
also been used to improve large-scale machine learning, e.g., by compressing model updates [24], identifying
significant coordinates in the gradient vectors [23], and reducing memory usage in model training [42].
However, these works do not focus on privacy.
Some recent efforts consider extensions to sketches to provide differential privacy through the use of random
noise [36], random sampling [48], or other randomization [5, 21]. However, they require adding these
mechanisms on top of sketches, and do not investigate any inherent privacy properties of sketches themselves.
Our analysis shows that sketches have inherent differential privacy properties (§3) and can be utilized to
design private distributed learning algorithms that achieve better communication and accuracy trade-offs
than state-of-the-art mechanisms (§4).
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Figure 1: An illustration of using Count Sketch S5×9 to compress a vector g ∈ Rn. Each element gi ∈ g is
mapped to five bins in five counter arrays via independent hash functions. It is difficult for third parties to
infer the original inputs. We prove that the Count Sketch algorithm is differentially private in §3.2.
3 Differential Privacy of Sketches
In this section, we analyze the intrinsic differential privacy properties of a canonical sketch (Count Sketch).
We begin by providing relevant background on Count Sketch and differential privacy, and then present our
differential privacy bounds in §3.2.
3.1 Preliminaries
Count Sketch is a common sketching algorithm that can be used to compress real-valued vectors. As depicted
in Figure 1, Count Sketch works by using t independent hash functions to map each element in a vector
g ∈ Rn to t distinct bins in arrays of size k  n. This may cause some collisions, and the goal of the sketch is
therefore to approximate the true values within bounded errors when queried. Due to the linearity of Count
Sketch, it can be used to compress messages in distributed settings, as it is easy to merge sketched messages
since S(g1 + g2) = S(g1) + S(g2) for a sketch method S and vectors g1 and g2.
We summarize Count Sketch in Algorithm 1, and defer interested readers to Charikar et al. [11] for additional
background. The algorithm consists of two key operations for any vector g ∈ Rn:
1. Encoding g into a sketch table St×k(g). To encode every gi ∈ g, we use a set of pairwise independent
hash functions {hj,1≤j≤t : [n] → [k]}, along with a set of 2-wise independent sign hash functions
{signj,1≤j≤t : [n]→ {+1,−1}} to map each gi to t different bins in the arrays of the table.
2. Querying St×k(g) to obtain an estimation g˜ of g. To query gi from St×k(g), we query the median of
t approximated values identified by the indexes of hj(i) (1 ≤ j ≤ t). To achieve µL2 additive errors
on g˜ with 1 − δ probability, the size of the table (t and k) are configurable as t = O (ln( 1δ )) and
k = O
(
1
µ2
)
[11].
When analyzing Count Sketch, our insight is that the randomization from the independent hash functions
potentially provides differential privacy in the sketch table. Intuitively, in Count Sketch, the differences in
the output distribution caused by minor changes in the input should be bounded with high probability. This
observation mirrors the definition of differential privacy, as formally stated below.
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Algorithm 1 Count Sketch to compress g ∈ Rn.
1: Input: g ∈ Rn, t, k, St×k, hi (1 ≤ i ≤ t), signi (1 ≤ i ≤ t)
2: Compress vector g ∈ Rn into S(g):
3: Initialize St×k to all zeros’s
4: for gi ∈ g do
5: for j = 1, · · · , t do
6: S[j][hj(i)]← S[j][hj(i)] + signj(i) · gi
7: end for
8: end for
9: return St×k
10: Query g˜ ∈ Rn from S(g):
11: for i = 1, · · · , n do
12: g˜i = Median{signj(i) · S[j][hj(i)] : 1 ≤ j ≤ t}
13: end for
14: return g˜
Definition 1 (ε-differential privacy [18]). A randomized mechanism M satisfies ε-differential privacy, if for
input data D1 and D2 differing by up to one element, and for any output S of M,
Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ eε · Pr[M(D2) ∈ S].
Informally, the above definition states that when ε is small enough, the two output distributions are closer
to each other, and the method M becomes more private as it is difficult to determine whether the input is
D1 or D2. There are two common privacy models in distributed networks: local privacy where the central
aggregator/server is not trusted, and global privacy where we assume a trusted central server [17, 44]. As
discussed in §4, our proposed framework DiffSketch leveraging Count Sketch satisfies the stronger local
privacy model. We next analyze the differential privacy properties of Count Sketch.
3.2 Differential Privacy Analysis
To analyze the privacy guarantees of sketches, we need to provide some measurement of the output distribution
that reflects the amount of noise that results from hash collisions in the sketch. To achieve this, we quantify
the input data distribution with the following assumptions: (a) each element in the input vector is bounded
with a large probability, and (b) the inputs are drawn from Gaussian distributions. Under these assumptions,
we provide the first differential privacy guarantees of Count Sketch without any additional noise.
Assumption 1 (Input vector distribution). Following the work of Fergus et al. [19], Gong and Sbalzarini
[22], Levin et al. [26], Parmas [38], we assume that for any input vector D with length |D| = n, each element
di ∈ D is drawn I.I.D. from a Gaussian distribution: di ∼ N (0, σ2), and bounded by a constant with a large
probability: |di| ≤ α, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for some constant α.
As discussed in §4, we apply Count Sketch to compress gradients (or model updates) in distributed learning.
Therefore, the input vectors are gradients (or model updates) generated from the workers’ local data. We
note that similar assumptions on normality have been previously used to characterize gradients for other
applications [e.g., 19, 22, 26, 38]. We also empirically verify that the gradients or model updates closely
match Gaussian distributions, and plot the distribution of real updates in Figure 7 and 8 in Appendix C.2.
As we will discuss, our local privacy bound is a function of the local gradients/model updates bound α and
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its variance σ2. When leveraging sketches for privacy, we dynamically estimate α and σ2 locally for each
participating worker during training without prior knowledge, and use the estimated values to compute the
privacy parameter ε.
Next, we state a lemma about Count Sketch’s error bounds before proving the differential privacy in our
main theorem.
Lemma 1 (Estimation error of Count Sketch [11]). For a sketching mechanism M using Count Sketch with
t arrays of k bins, for any input element di ∈ D and query Q, with probability p ≥ 1− δ,
|Q(M(di))− di| ≤ µ‖D‖2,
where k = O
(
e
µ2
)
, and t = O
(
ln( 1δ )
)
.
Lemma 1 states the error guarantee of Count Sketch, i.e., that with high probability, the recovered/estimated
values are very close to the original value, with a small error up to a fraction µ of L2 norm of the input
vector. With this lemma, we can translate the bound of the input values to the bound of every value in the
output sketching table, which will be used in our proof. We provide the differential privacy guarantees of a
basic Count Sketch M in our main theorem below.
Theorem 2 (ε-differential privacy of Count Sketch). For a sketching algorithm M using Count Sketch
St×k with t arrays of k bins, for any input vector D with length n satisfying Assumption 1, M achieves
t · ln
(
1 + βα
2k(k−1)
σ2(n−2) (1 + ln(n− k))
)
-differential privacy with high probability, where β is a positive constant
satisfying α
2k(k−1)
σ2(n−2) (1 + ln(n− k)) ≤ 12 − 1β .
We defer readers to Appendix A for a detailed proof, and provide a high-level sketch here: Since the t counter
arrays are independent, we first derive the output probability density functions of a single counter array.
Based on the sketching algorithm (Algorithm 1) as well as the input distributions (Assumption 1), we can
show that the output distribution is a mixture of Gaussians. Since we assume uniformly bounded inputs, we
can then prove that the difference of two output distributions before and after one input element changes is
also bounded. The overall privacy guarantee is then multiplied by t given the independence between arrays.
To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first differential privacy proof for vanilla Count Sketch without
additional randomization. From Theorem 2, we see that the privacy parameter ε will become smaller when
the size of the input vector, n, gets smaller, and we can achieve nearly zero-differential privacy when n
is large enough. Theorem 2 also reveals natural trade-offs between accuracy, communication, and privacy.
For instance, if we use a smaller sketching table to compress the input vector (smaller t or k), we are
compressing more aggressively (losing more information) and M will be more private with a smaller ε
parameter—potentially at the cost of overall accuracy.
4 Proposed Framework: DiffSketch
In this section, we introduce DiffSketch, a general framework for distributed learning. We begin by
describing DiffSketch’s end-to-end approach for reducing communication and enforcing differential privacy
using sketches (§4.1). We then show how DiffSketch can be applied to both classical distributed machine
learning, with distributed SGD (§4.2), and federated learning, with FedAvg (§4.3).
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Algorithm 2 Proposed framework: DiffSketch.
1: Input: T , v1, · · · , vm, ε
2: for t = 0, · · · , T − 1 do
3: Compression: Each entity k compresses vk to obtain S(vk) based on Algorithm 1
4: Validation: Each entity validates if it satisfies ε-differential privacy for a given ε. If not, add
appropriate Laplacian or Gaussian noise to S(vk)
5: Aggregation: The server aggregates local information to obtain S(v) = 1m (S1 + · · ·+ Sm)
6: Query: Each entity queries S(v) for the mean v˜ based on Algorithm 1
7: end for
4.1 DiffSketch: A Framework for Distributed Learning
DiffSketch is an efficient and private framework for distributed learning. On top of the existing distributed
methods, DiffSketch uses sketches to both preserve the privacy and reduce the size of transmitted messages
with small overhead. In particular, many distributed optimization methods perform work in parallel (e.g.,
computing gradients), and then aggregate local information from distributed entities by calculating a mean
(e.g., computing the average mini-batch of gradients). These tasks can be completed using a sketch through the
Aggregation and Query steps. As depicted in Algorithm 2, DiffSketch has two additional simple operations:
Compression and Validation.
The complete operations in DiffSketch are as follows: Compression: At each round, entity k uses sketches
to compress the local information v into a privatized S(vk). Validation: Once the compression is done, each
local worker needs to verify if sketching alone satisfies ε-differential privacy (based on Theorem 2). If not, we
may need to ensure a consistent privacy guarantee with some additional noise. As sketches have provable
privacy, zero or a small amount of noise is expected (we verify this empirically in §5). Aggregation: The
central server aggregates the local information and sends the aggregated (i.e., averaged) local updates back.
Query: Each local entity approximately recovers the updated global information from the (merged) sketch.
As mentioned in the related work (§2) and preliminaries (§3.1), local differential privacy does not assume a
trusted central server, and the server cannot see individual inputs. Since DiffSketch allows each worker to
sketch the vectors locally before sending the compressed sketching table to the server, we are privatizing data
at a local level, thus protecting against third-parties including the central server.
Generality. We note that DiffSketch is a general framework for a variety of distributed learning scenarios
where user data needs to be protected. In this paper, we describe the applications to distributed SGD (§4.2)
and federated learning (§4.3). It can also be potentially applied to broader distributed data analysis tasks
with privacy concerns; the main requirement is simply that the workload is aggregating information across
the network via calculation of a mean of distributed vectors. DiffSketch’s modular design has two major
advantages: First, the provable accuracy guarantees and differential privacy for the compressed data help any
analysis algorithms to retain high accuracy. Second, the simple hashing-based computations in applying the
sketches to Compression and Query are light-weight operations. One can leverage efficient CPU parallelism
or hardware acceleration (e.g., SSE and AVX) to achieve optimized computation performance.
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4.2 DiffSketch for Distributed SGD
We first explore DiffSketch with distributed (mini-batch) SGD as a subroutine. Throughout the paper, we
assume the widely-used objective of minimizing the finite sum of the empirical loss:
min
w
F (w) =
m∑
k=1
pkFk(w) , (1)
where Fk is the local empirical loss on worker k, m is the total number of workers, and pk is the weight set
for worker k (e.g., 1m ). We consider possibly differing local data distributions across the network and possibly
non-convex Fk’s. In this work, we assume a classical synchronous and centralized training setup with m
workers connected to one central server.
A typical workflow of using distributed SGD to solve (1) is that at each updating round, each local worker
computes gradients using (a mini-batch of) local data and sends the gradients to the server, where they get
merged and sent back to the workers. We can directly apply Algorithm 2 to compress the gradients g’s sent
from workers to the server. The server can not see the raw gradients as they have been compressed and
masked into small sketching tables. See Algorithm 3 for more details. As sketches are guaranteed to preserve
the original skewed gradient values with high probabilities, the local workers can recover the merged gradients
with very high accuracies. In our experiments (§5), we demonstrate that the accuracy reduction is very minor
while the compression ratio is high (up to 50×).
Convergence. We also provide convergence guarantees for DiffSketch with distributed SGD for convex
functions. Our convergence results rely on the bounded estimation error of Count Sketch (Lemma 1), and
unbiasedness of Count Sketch [11]: For a Count Sketch M, for any input element di ∈ D and query Q,
E [Q(M(di)] = di. Together with Lemma 1, this guarantees that the estimated gradients are both unbiased
and uniformly bounded with high probability.
Theorem 3 (Convergence of DiffSketch in distributed SGD). Assume that E
[‖gk‖2] ≤ G2 for any input
stochastic gradient gk on device k with dimension n, E
[‖xi − x∗‖2] ≤ D2 at any iteration i, and the local
model at device k fk(x) is convex. Choose the step-size at round i ηi = c√i where c is a pre-defined positive
number. Using a Count Sketch with t hash functions and k bins, with probability (1− δ), we have:
F (x¯i)− F (x∗) ≤
D2
2c + c
√
i+1
i
(
nµ2 + 1
)
G2
√
i
,
where x∗ is the optimal solution to (1), k = O
(
e
µ2
)
, t = O
(
ln( 1δ )
)
, and x¯i = 1i
∑i
j=1 xj.
For simplicity, we abuse notations and use gk ∈ Rn to denote the gradient vector on device k. We provide
a detailed proof in Appendix B. Theorem 3 indicates that DiffSketch has the same convergence rate as
standard distributed SGD [20] under convex settings. It also indicates that as the number of hash functions t
and the number of bins k increase, we compress less and tend to get a tighter convergence bound (due to a
smaller recovery error µ) with a higher probability (lower δ).
4.3 DiffSketch for Federated Learning
Federated learning aims to fit a model to data generated by, and residing on, networks of hundreds to millions
of remote devices [34]. Applying DiffSketch must carefully consider unique challenges associated with this
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Algorithm 3 DiffSketch with distributed SGD.
1: Input: T , η, w0, ε
2: for t = 0, · · · , T − 1 do
3: if t > 0 then
4: Server sends the sketched global gradient S(gt) to all workers
5: Each worker queries S(gt) for g˜t
6: Each worker updates: wt = wt−1 − ηg˜t
7: end if
8: Each worker k runs (mini-batch) SGD on wt to obtain local gradients gt+1k
9: Each worker sketches the gradients locally to obtain S(gt+1k )
10: Each worker adds additional Laplacian noise to S(gt+1k ) if not satisfying ε-differential privacy
11: Each worker sends S(gt+1k ) to the server
12: Server aggregates the model updates: S(gt+1) = 1m
∑m
k=1 S(g
t+1
k )
13: end for
Algorithm 4 DiffSketch in federated learning.
1: Input: K, T , η, E, w0, pk, ε
2: for t = 0, · · · , T − 1 do
3: Server samples a subset St of K devices (each device is chosen with probability pk)
4: if t > 0 then
5: Server sends the sketched global model S(∆wt) to all chosen devices
6: Each device k queries S(∆wt) for ∆w˜t
7: Each device k updates: wt = wt−1 + ∆wt
8: end if
9: Each device k updates wt for E epochs of SGD on Fk with step-size η to obtain ∆wt+1k
10: Each device k sketches the updates locally to obtain S(∆wt+1k )
11: Each device k adds additional Laplacian noise to S(∆wt+1k ) if not satisfying ε-differential privacy
12: Each device k sends S(∆wt+1k ) to the server
13: Server aggregates the model updates: S(∆wt+1) = 1K
∑
k∈St S(∆w
t+1
k )
14: end for
setting—the large scale of the networks, expensive communication, strict privacy requirements, and a high
degree of heterogeneity across devices [29]. In practice, it is common that only a small fraction of devices
are active at each round [7]. Optimization methods using local updating and tolerating low participation of
devices have become the de facto solvers for federated settings; of these, FedAvg is most widely-used [34].
DiffSketch can use FedAvg as a subroutine and similarly account for important characteristics in federated
learning. At each communication round, it randomly samples a subset of devices, lets each participating
device perform E epochs of local updates, applies Count Sketch to compress the updates, and averages the
updates centrally. Details are summarized in Algorithm 4. Empirically, we demonstrate that DiffSketch can
compress communication by up to 20× and provide strong local privacy guarantees (ε = 1) on real federated
datasets (§5).
We note that in federated settings with non-identically distributed data, FedAvg is a heuristic and may
not converge despite its overall robust practical performance [28, 34]. Therefore, we also do not provide
convergence guarantees for DiffSketch in this setting, though we explore the method empirically in §5.
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5 Evaluation
We now present empirical results for the DiffSketch framework. In §5.2, we compare DiffSketch with
other baselines that can reduce communication and preserve privacy simultaneously, and demonstrate
the superior performance of DiffSketch. In §5.3, we investigate the trade-off between privacy, com-
munication, and accuracy in DiffSketch. All code, data, and experiments are publicly available at
github.com/litian96/DiffSketch.
5.1 Simulation Setups
Datasets. For distributed SGD, we randomly subsample from the MNIST dataset for image classification
and form 10 partitions with identical distributions across local workers. For federated learning, we use
the Shakespeare dataset, which is a popular dataset curated from federated learning benchmarks [9]. It is
naturally partitioned in a heterogeneous way where each device is associated with a speaking role in the
plays. To investigate a setup that is favorable to cpSGD [3], we partition MNIST into 6,000 subsets with one
subset corresponding to a device, as we observe that the privacy bound in cpSGD becomes tighter (better) if
sampling from a larger number of devices. Data statistics are summarized in Table 2, Appendix C.
Implementation. We implement Algorithm 3 and 4 in Tensorflow [1], and simulate a one server and m
workers setup (see Table 2 in Appendix C). To further improve the performance of sketches, we consider
several simple implementation optimizations as follows. In distributed SGD, each local worker compares the
queried results with the local gradients, and sets half of the gradients with inaccurate estimations (larger
gaps) to zero. For both distributed SGD and federated learning, we generate some random noise drawn from
the same Gaussian distribution as the original gradients (or model updates), and append the noise vector
after the input. By increasing the size of the input and thus compressing more values, we are boosting the
privacy of sketches. All ε values reported in the following experiments are local privacy guarantees—each
local worker achieves ε-differential privacy at each round. See full details in Appendix C.1.
5.2 Comparison with Baselines
In this section, we compare with several baseline methods that address both communication and privacy,
including cpSGD [3], a state-of-the-art method that aims optimize both aspects (though it treats each
separately). As secure multi-party computation (SMC) is generally inefficient in distributed learning (as
discussed in §2), we do not compare with methods based on SMC.
Figure 2: DiffSketch compared with cpSGD. Under the same privacy guarantees (ε = 5 or 10) and the
same communication compression ratio, DiffSketch achieves significantly higher accuracy. If we continue to
decrease ε to improve the privacy, cpSGD will perform even worse.
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cpSGD. cpSGD [3] first quantizes the gradients to reduce communication, then adds Binomial noise to the
quantized gradients to offer differential privacy. We compare DiffSketch with cpSGD on MNIST*. Results
are shown in Figure 2. We see that across different ε values and compression ratios, by considering privacy
and communication jointly, DiffSketch achieves significant improvements of up to 50% in absolute test
accuracy over cpSGD.
DiffSketch Raw gradients + noise                       Sketch + all noise 
Figure 3: DiffSketch compared with other baselines in the distributed SGD setting. We show the test
accuracy versus total communication in log scale. The total amount of communication is normalized
via dividing the communication rounds by the compression ratio. Given the same amount of privacy,
(1) DiffSketch converges with orders-of-magnitude less communication than directly adding noise to the
gradients (orange line), and (2) DiffSketch is more accurate than treating sketches as plain-text and directly
adding noise to sketches at all communication rounds (blue line). This indicates that DiffSketch is inherently
private such that less (or zero) additional noise is sufficient to provide the same privacy guarantees. The
sketch sizes of 50× and 75× compression ratios are 7× 22 and 7× 15, respectively.
DiffSketch Raw updates + noise                          Sketch + all noise 
Figure 4: DiffSketch compared with other baselines in federated learning. Again, we note here that the total
amount of communication is in log scale. Similar to Figure 3, it indicates that DiffSketch can significantly
improve test accuracy while offering the same privacy and communication benefits. We observe that smaller
ε values would cause baseline methods to diverge, and so we investigate slightly larger ε’s. The sketch sizes
of 15× and 20× compression ratios are 10× 190 and 10× 245.
Other baselines. We next compare with two natural alternatives that optimize for privacy in practice: (1)
directly adding Laplacian noise to the raw gradients transmitted between the workers and the central server
to offer (local) differential privacy, and (2) treating sketches as plain-text, and adding Laplacian noise after
sketching at all updating rounds to offer both privacy and compression [36]. The results are shown in Figure 3
(for distributed SGD) and Figure 4 (for federated learning). In both settings, we see that DiffSketch
converges faster than adding noise to raw gradients as the amount of communication is significantly reduced
by sketching. Also, DiffSketch is more accurate than adding additional noise to sketches at all iterations,
especially when ε is smaller. This is because in order to guarantee stronger privacy with smaller ε’s, the
baseline approach (in blue) needs to add more noise on top of sketches, thus hurting model performance,
while DiffSketch only adds a small amount of noise when necessary (Figure 9 in the appendix).
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5.3 Trade-offs in DiffSketch
Finally, we explore trade-offs in DiffSketch between communication, privacy, and accuracy.
Accuracy vs. compression. We plot the testing accuracy with the total amount of communication under
different compression ratios for both distributed SGD and federated learning in Figure 5. As the compression
ratio increases, we obtain faster convergence with less communication, but have potentially lower final
accuracy. We note that many existing works in model compression explore techniques for improving accuracy
under high compression ratios [e.g., 25, 30]; although outside the focus of this work, these techniques could
be combined with our work to further boost the compression ratios.
Privacy vs. communication. We show how compression relates to differential privacy in Figure 6. The ε
values are averaged across all communication rounds. In our experiments, sketches themselves are sufficient
to provide privacy benefits without additional noise in most communication rounds. We can see that a higher
compression ratio leads to more privacy (smaller ε).
Figure 5: As the compression ratio becomes higher, DiffSketch converges faster, but with potentially lower
accuracies.
Figure 6: As we compress more, we can reduce communication and obtain stronger privacy guarantees with
smaller ε values.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we examined connections between communication reduction and privacy preservation in
distributed machine learning. We first proved that canonical sketches (Count Sketch) have inherent differential
privacy benefits without additional mechanisms. Based on our theoretical understandings, we designed
DiffSketch, a framework for efficient and private distributed learning. We applied DiffSketch to classical
distributed SGD and federated learning, and demonstrated empirically that DiffSketch achieves 5%-50%
absolute accuracy improvements compared with baselines while offering the same communication and privacy
benefits. While we explored such connections via sketches, a natural direction of future work is to investigate
whether other tools from the privacy or distributed learning communities may similarly provide benefits for
both privacy and communication simultaneously.
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A Proof for Theorem 2
Theorem: (ε-differential privacy of Count Sketch) For a sketching algorithm M using Count Sketch
St×k with t arrays of k bins, for any input vector D with length n satisfying Assumption 1, M achieves
t ln
(
1 + βα
2k(k−1)
σ2(n−2) (1 + ln(n− k))
)
-differential privacy with high probability, where β is a positive constant
satisfying α
2k(k−1)
σ2(n−2) (1 + ln(n− k)) ≤ 12 − 1β .
Notations. We first list the notations that will be used throughout the proof.
• Input vector: D = {d1, · · · , dn}, |D| = n
• The constructed data structure: S
• Number of bins in one counter array (i.e., one row of S): k
• Number of hash functions (number of counter arrays): t
• Random variables of the bin values in one counter array: B1, · · · , Bk
• Bin values in one counter array: b1, · · · , bk
• Random variables of numbers of elements in D mapped to k bins: A1, · · · , Ak
• Numbers of elements in D mapped to k bins: a1, · · · , ak
We state one lemma that will be used in the proof for Theorem 2.
Lemma 2. Given
∑k
i=1 ai = n−1, ai ∈ Z+, a1!·a2! · · · ak!·
√
a1 · a2 · · · ak is minimized when max{|ai−aj |, 1 ≤
i, j ≤ k} ≤ 1; also 1a1 + · · ·+ 1ak is minimized when max{|ai − aj |, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k} ≤ 1.
Proof. Let f(a1, a2, · · · , ak) = a1! · a2! · · · ak! · √a1 · a2 · · · ak. If there exists aj 6= ai and ai + 2 ≤ aj , then
f(a1, · · · , ai + 1, · · · , aj − 1, · · · , ak) < f(a1, a2, · · · , ak). This is because
f(a1, a2, · · · , ak)
f(a1, · · · , ai + 1, · · · , aj − 1, · · · , ak) =
√
aia3j
(ai + 1)3(aj − 1)
aj=ai+k=
√
ai(ai + k)3
(ai + 1)3(ai + k − 1)
=
√
a4i + 3ka3i + 3k2a2i + k3ai
a4i + (2 + k)a3i + 3ka2i + (3k − 2)ai + k − 1
> 1,
where the last inequality is due to
(2k − 2)a3i + (3k2 − 3k)a2i + (k3 − 3k + 2)ai ≥ 1.
We can adjust ai to ai + 1, aj to aj − 1 to get a lower value of f . After limited times of such adjustments,
f(a1, · · · , ak) will be minimized when the integers a1, a2, · · · , ak satisfy max{|ai − aj |, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k} ≤ 1.
Similarly, we can easily extend the above analysis to 1a1 + · · · + 1ak and prove that it gets minimized if
max{|ai − aj |, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k} ≤ 1.
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We next prove our main results Theorem 2.
Proof. We first prove that when t = 1, the sketching algorithm using S1×k with one array and k bins (i.e., k
counters in the array) achieves ln
(
1 + βα
2k(k−1)
σ2(n−2) (1 + ln(n− k))
)
-differential privacy with high probability,
where β is a constant satisfying α
2k(k−1)
σ2(n−2) (1 + ln(n− k)) ≤ 12 − 1β .
Suppose two input vectors D and D′ differ in one element with D = D0 + {c} and D′ = D0 + {d}. Since the
output is independent of the order of compressing each element in D, we consider mapping c (or d) at last. c
(or d) is mapped to each bin with equal probability, and they might be flipped by the sign hash functions
with a probability 12 . Therefore,
P (b1, b2, · · · , bk|D) = 12kP (b1 − c, b2, · · · , bk|D0) +
1
2kP (b1 + c, b2, · · · , bk|D0) + · · ·
+ 12kP (b1, b2, · · · , bk + c|D0) +
1
2kP (b1, b2, · · · , bk − c|D0),
P (b1, b2, · · · , bk|D′) = 12kP (b1 − d, b2, · · · , bk|D0) +
1
2kP (b1 + d, b2, · · · , bk|D0) + · · ·
+ 12kP (b1, b2, · · · , bk + d|D0) +
1
2kP (b1, b2, · · · , bk − d|D0).
Denote Pn(a1,··· ,ak) as the probability that ai (1 ≤ i ≤ k) items are mapped to bin i and
∑k
i=1 ai = n. Denote
Gn(a1,··· ,ak) as the probability density function of a k-dimensional Gaussian N
0,
σ
2a1
. . .
σ2ak

 and
∑k
i=1 ai = n. Note that
P (b1 − c, b2, · · · , bk|D0) =
∑
{a1,··· ,ak}
Pn−1(a1,··· ,ak)G
n−1
(a1,··· ,ak)(b1 − c, b2, · · · , bk).
We first consider the upper-bound of:
P (b1 − c, b2, · · · , bk|D0)
P (b1 − d, b2, · · · , bk|D0) =
∑
{a1,··· ,ak} P
n−1
(a1,··· ,ak)G
n−1
(a1,··· ,ak)(b1 − c, b2, · · · , bk)∑
{a1,··· ,ak} P
n−1
(a1,··· ,ak)G
n−1
(a1,··· ,ak)(b1 − d, b2, · · · , bk)
,
where the joint probability distribution of number of items when putting n− 1 items into k bins {b1, · · · , bk}
is denoted as Pn−1(a1,··· ,ak) =
(n−1)!
kn−1·a1!···ak! . We assume that each bin has at least one item, so there are
(
n−2
k−1
)
ways in total to put n− 1 items into k bins. Note that probability that each bin has at least one item given k
bins and n− 1 items is ∑kj=0(−1)j(kj) (1− jk)n−1, so the following differential privacy properties with one
hash function hold with a high probability at most
∑k
j=0(−1)j
(
k
j
) (
1− jk
)n−1.
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Denote x as {b1 − c, b2, · · · , bk}, since e− 12xᵀΣᵀx ≤ 1, we have:∑
{a1,··· ,ak} P
n−1
(a1,··· ,ak)G
n−1
(a1,··· ,ak)(b1 − c, b2, · · · , bk)∑
{a1,··· ,ak} P
n−1
(a1,··· ,ak)G
n−1
(a1,··· ,ak)(b1 − d, b2, · · · , bk)
(2)
≤
∑
{a1,··· ,ak}
1
a1!·a2!···ak!
1√
a1·a2····ak∑
{a1,··· ,ak}
1
a1!·a2!···ak!
1√
a1·a2····ak e
[
− 12σ2
(
(b1−d)2
a1
+ (b2)
2
a2
+···+ (bk)2ak
)]
≤
∑
{a1,··· ,ak}
1
a1!·a2!···ak!
1√
a1·a2····ak∑
{a1,··· ,ak}
1
a1!·a2!···ak!
1√
a1·a2····ak e
[
− 12σ2
(
γ
a1
+ γa2 +···+
γ
ak
)] , (3)
where γ = max{(b1 − d)2, b22, · · · , b2k}. From the bounded estimation errors of sketching (Lemma 1), we know
that b2i ≤ α2 (∀i) with a large probability. So γ ≤ 4α2 holds with high probability.
Note that (3) can be viewed as an multiplicative inverse of weighted sum on e
[
− 12
(
γ
a1
+ γa2 +···+
γ
ak
)]
with
weights 1a1!·a2!···ak!
1√
a1·a2···ak . From Lemma 2, we know that both e
[
− 12
(
γ
a1
+ γa2 +···+
γ
ak
)]
and the weights
1
a1!·a2!···ak!
1√
a1·a2···ak are maximized simultaneously when a1, a2, · · · , ak satisfies max{|ai − aj |, 1 ≤ i, j ≤
k} ≤ 1. If we set all weights to be equal, then the inverse of the weighted sum will become larger, w.h.p.
Therefore, ∑
{a1,··· ,ak}
1
a1!·a2!···ak!
1√
a1·a2····ak∑
{a1,··· ,ak}
1
a1!·a2!···ak!
1√
a1·a2····ak e
[
− 12σ2
(
γ
a1
+ γa2 +···+
γ
ak
)] ≤ (n−2k−1)∑
{a1,··· ,ak} e
[
− 12σ2
(
γ
a1
+ γa2 +···+
γ
ak
)]
≤
(
n−2
k−1
)
∑
{a1,··· ,ak}
(
1− 12σ2
(
γ
a1
+ γa2 + · · ·+
γ
ak
))
(4)
=
(
n−2
k−1
)(
n−2
k−1
)− 12σ2 ∑{a1,··· ,ak} ( γa1 + γa2 + · · ·+ γak)
= 1
1−
1
2σ2
∑
{a1,··· ,ak}
(
γ
a1
+ γa2 +···+
γ
ak
)
(n−2k−1)
,
(4) holds because for any real number x, e−x ≥ 1−x. (4) also requires∑{a1,··· ,ak} (1− 12σ2 ( γa1 + γa2 + · · ·+ γak))
≥ 0, which we will enforce again later.
We next consider to upper-bound
γ
2σ2
∑
{a1,··· ,ak}
(
1
a1
+ 1a2 +···+
1
ak
)
(n−2k−1)
.
If we place j items into one specific bin, there are
(
n−2−j
k−2
)
ways to put the remaining n− 1− j items to k− 1
bins. Therefore, in the sum
∑
{a1,··· ,ak}
(
1
a1
+ 1a2 + · · ·+ 1ak
)
, for each bin i, ai = j (1 ≤ j ≤ n− k) appears
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(
n−2−j
k−2
)
times. And there are k bins, so we have:
γ
2σ2
∑
{a1,··· ,ak}
(
1
a1
+ 1a2 + · · ·+ 1ak
)
(
n−2
k−1
) = γ2σ2 k
(
1
(
n−3
k−2
)
+ 12
(
n−4
k−2
)
+ · · ·+ 1n−k
(
k−2
k−2
))(
n−2
k−1
)
=
γ
2σ2 k
∑n−k
i=1
1
i
(
n−2−i
k−2
)(
n−2
k−1
) .
By expanding and rearranging the terms, we get:
γ
2σ2 k
∑n−k
i=1
1
i
(
n−2−i
k−2
)(
n−2
k−1
) = γ2σ2 k(k − 1)(n− 2)(n− 3) · · · · (n− k)
n−k∑
i=1
1
i
(n− i− 2) (n− i− 3) · · · (n− i− (k − 1))
=
γ
2σ2 k(k − 1)
n− 2
n−k∑
i=1
1
i
(n− i− 2)(n− i− 3) · · · (n− i− (k − 1))
(n− 3)(n− 4) · · · · (n− k) (5)
≤
γ
2σ2 k(k − 1)
n− 2
n−k∑
i=1
1
i
(6)
≤
γ
2σ2 k(k − 1)
n− 2 (1 + ln(n− k)) (7)
≤ 2α
2k(k − 1)
σ2(n− 2) (1 + ln(n− k)) . (8)
(7) holds because
∑k
i=1
1
i ≤ 1 + ln k (∀k), and (8) is due to γ ≤ 4α2 (with high probability).
Therefore,
1
1−
γ
2σ2
∑
{a1,··· ,ak}
(
1
a1
+ 1a2 +···+
1
ak
)
(n−2k−1)
≤ 1
1− 2α2k(k−1)σ2(n−2) (1 + ln(n− k))
≤ 1 + βα
2k(k − 1)
σ2(n− 2) (1 + ln(n− k)) (β > 0),
where the second inequality holds when α
2k(k−1)
σ2(n−2) (1 + ln(n− k)) ≤ 12 − 1β (β > 0).
Thus,
P (b1 − c, b2, · · · , bk|D0)
P (b1 − d, b2, · · · , bk|D0) ≤ 1 +
βα2k(k − 1)
σ2(n− 2) (1 + ln(n− k)).
Similarly, for any i (1 ≤ i ≤ k), we have:
P (b1, · · · , bi − c, · · · , bk|D0)
P (b1, · · · , bi − d, · · · , bk|D0) ≤ 1 +
βα2k(k − 1)
σ2(n− 2) (1 + ln(n− k)),
and
P (b1, · · · , bi + c, · · · , bk|D0)
P (b1, · · · , bi + d, · · · , bk|D0) ≤ 1 +
βα2k(k − 1)
σ2(n− 2) (1 + ln(n− k)).
Thus,
P (b1, b2, · · · , bk|D)
P (b1, b2, · · · , bk|D′) ≤ 1 +
βα2k(k − 1)
σ2(n− 2) (1 + ln(n− k)),
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which indicates that the sketching algorithmM with input size n using Count Sketch with k bins (k counters)
and 1 hash function (1 array) achieves ln
(
1 + βα
2k(k−1)
σ2(n−2) (1 + ln(n− k))
)
-differential privacy with a large
probability, where β is a positive constant satisfying α
2k(k−1)
σ2(n−2) (1 + ln(n− k)) ≤ 12 − 1β . Since the t counter
arrays are pairwise independent, it follows that Count Sketch with k bins (k counters) and t arrays achieves
t · ln
(
1 + βα
2k(k−1)
σ2(n−2) (1 + ln(n− k))
)
-differential privacy with a large probability, where β is a positive constant
satisfying α
2k(k−1)
σ2(n−2) (1 + ln(n− k)) ≤ 12 − 1β .
B Proof for Theorem 3
Theorem: (Convergence of DiffSketch in distributed SGD) Assume that E
[‖gk‖2] ≤ G2 for any input
stochastic gradient gk on worker k with dimension n, E
[‖xi − x∗‖2] ≤ D2 at any iteration i, and the local
model at device k fk(x) is convex. Choose the step-size at round i ηi = c√i where c is a pre-defined positive
number. Using a Count Sketch with t hash functions and k bins, with probability 1− δ, we have the following
convergence rate on the global objective F :
F (x¯i)− F (x∗) ≤
D2
2c + c
√
i+1
i
(
nµ2 + 1
)
G2
√
i
,
where x∗ is the optimal solution to (1), k = O
(
e
µ2
)
, t = O
(
ln( 1δ )
)
, and x¯i = 1i
∑i
j=1 xj .
Proof. Because the local loss function fk and the global loss function F are convex, we have
〈∇fk(xi), xi − x∗〉 ≥ fk(xi)− fk(x∗),
and
〈∇F (xi), xi − x∗〉 ≥ F (xi)− F (x∗).
We use g˜k to denote the estimated stochastic gradient on worker k after querying the sketch table at the
current iteration i (we omit the subscript i for cleaner notations). Suppose K worker are selected at each
updating round, the updating rule is xi+1 = xi − ηi 1K
∑K
k=1 g˜k, and we have
E
[
‖xi+1 − x∗‖2
]
= E
∥∥∥∥∥xi − ηi 1K
K∑
k=1
g˜k − x∗
∥∥∥∥∥
2
= E
[
‖xi − x∗‖2
]
− 2ηiE
[〈
1
K
K∑
k=1
g˜k, xi − x∗
〉]
+ η2i E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1K
K∑
k=1
g˜k
∥∥∥∥∥
2 .
From Lemma 1, we know that the estimation error of Count Sketch is bounded. In particular, it holds that
with probability p ≥ 1− δ,
E
[
‖g˜k − gk‖2
]
≤ E
[
n (µ ‖gk‖2)2
]
≤ nµ2G2,
where k = O
(
e
µ2
)
and t = O
(
ln
( 1
δ
))
. Thus,
E
[
‖g˜k‖2
]
= E
[
‖g˜k − gk + gk‖2
]
≤ E [2 (‖g˜k − gk‖2 + ‖gk‖2)]
≤ 2 (nµ2 + 1)G2.
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Further, we have
E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1K
K∑
k=1
g˜k
∥∥∥∥∥
2 = 1
K2
E
∥∥∥∥∥
K∑
k=1
g˜k
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
K2
·K ·
K∑
k=1
E
[
‖g˜k‖2
]
≤ 2 (nµ2 + 1)G2.
In addition, as sketches produce an unbiased estimation of the stochastic gradient, which is an unbiased
estimation of the true gradient, we have E [g˜k] = E [∇fk] (the expectation is with respect to the randomly
sampled data point and the randomized sketch algorithm). And E
[
1
K
∑K
k=1 g˜k
]
= E
[
1
K
∑K
k=1∇fk
]
=
E [∇F (xi)] Applying the bounded variance and the unbiased compression, it follows:
E
[‖xi+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ E [‖xi − x∗‖2]− 2ηiE [〈∇F (xi), xi − x∗〉] + 2η2i (nµ2 + 1)G2
≤ E [‖xi − x∗‖2]− 2ηi (F (xi)− F (x∗)) + 2η2i (nµ2 + 1)G2
⇒2 (F (xi)− F (x∗)) ≤ 1
ηi
E
[‖xi − x∗‖2]− 1
ηi
E
[‖xi+1 − x∗‖2]+ 2ηi (nµ2 + 1)G2.
Summarizing the inequalities for j = 1, · · · , i, we get
2
i∑
j=i
(F (xj)− F (x∗)) ≤ 1
ηj
E
[‖x1 − x∗‖2]+ i∑
j=2
(
1
ηj
− 1
ηj−1
)
E
[‖xj − x∗‖2]+ k∑
j=1
2ηj
(
nµ2 + 1
)
G2
≤ 1
ηj
D2 +
i∑
j=2
(
1
ηj
− 1
ηj−1
)
D2 +
i∑
j=1
2ηj
(
nµ2 + 1
)
G2
≤
√
i
c
D2 + 2c
√
i+ 1
(
nµ2 + 1
)
G2.
From Jensen’s inequality, we have
i∑
j=1
F (xj)− F (x∗) ≥ F (x¯i)− F (x∗),
which indicates that
F (x¯i)− F (x∗) ≤
√
i
2cD
2 + c
√
i+ 1
(
nµ2 + 1
)
G2
i
.
This completes the proof.
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C Evaluation Details
C.1 Implementation Details
We first describe the implementation details for each experiment comparing with different baselines.
Figure 3. We perform error correction for both DiffSketch and the baseline method of adding Laplacian
noise after sketching. At each round, each local worker computes the gap between the latest local gradient
and the (estimated) aggregated gradients. Since data are identically distributed across all workers, if the
estimation is correct, we expect that the gap should be small. Therefore, each worker sets half of the queried
results to zero if he sees a large gap. For DiffSketch, we also generate a noise vector drawn from the same
Gaussian as the raw gradients, and append that noise vector to the input for compression. The noise vector
increases the size of the input, thus boosting the privacy for sketches.
Figure 4. We do not perform error correction for any methods, since the local gradients would be stale in
federated learning due to device sampling. Similarly, we append a noise vector after the raw model updates.
Figure 2. We use the δ, s, p values suggested in Agarwal et al. [3]. We set up 6,000 workers (MNIST*) for
this experiment, and select 10 at each round. We use a different variant of MNIST because the privacy
bound of cpSGD will be tighter with a larger number of total workers. For cpSGD, we calculate the k,m values
(corresponding to the k,m parameters in the original paper) based on the given ε and compression ratios, as
summarized in the following table 1.
Table 1: Parameter configuratioins for cpSGD
ε Bits (Compression) k m
5 4 (10×) 12 4
5 5 (6×) 23 9
10 4 (10×) 14 2
10 5 (6×) 28 4
Datasets. We summarize the statistics of the datasets below.
Table 2: Statistics of Datasets
Dataset Workers Param. Samples/device
mean stdev
MNIST 10 7,850 200 0
Shakespeare 46 39,720 742 548
MNIST* 6,000 7,850 10 0
Hyper-parameters. We assume that the input gradients are bounded by a constant α with a 90%
probability; therefore, we dynamically choose the 90th percentile value of the local gradient vector as α on
each worker. For all experiments, we use a batch size of 10. The learning rates of MNIST, MNSIT*, and
Shakespeare are 0.01, 0.01, and 0.8. For each comparison, we fix the mini-batch orders and (if needed) the
selected devices per round.
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C.2 Real Gradient Distributions
We plot the real gradient distributions for MNIST and model updates distribution for Shakespeare without
compression in Figure 7 and Figure 8. When applying DiffSketch, we observe that their gradient/model
update distributions throughout the training across are similar. In MNIST, there are ten workers participating
in training at each round and the data on the ten workers are identically distributed. We randomly select one
worker at each round and report the gradient distribution from that worker. We repeat this for ten rounds.
In Shakespeare, we only sample one device per round; therefore we show the model update distributions of
ten selected devices in ten rounds.
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Figure 7: Gradient distributions of MNIST
 Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ Ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ
 Ϭ
 ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ
 Z Ž Ƶ Ŷ Ě  ϭ
 Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ Ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ
 Ϭ
 ϱ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ
 Z Ž Ƶ Ŷ Ě  Ϯ
 Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ Ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ
 Ϭ
 ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ
 Z Ž Ƶ Ŷ Ě  ϯ
 Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ Ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ
 Ϭ
 ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ
 Z Ž Ƶ Ŷ Ě  ϰ
 Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ Ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ
 Ϭ
 ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ
 Z Ž Ƶ Ŷ Ě  ϱ
 Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ Ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ
 Ϭ
 ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ
 Z Ž Ƶ Ŷ Ě  ϲ
 Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ Ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ
 Ϭ
 ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ
 Z Ž Ƶ Ŷ Ě  ϳ
 Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ Ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ
 Ϭ
 ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ
 Z Ž Ƶ Ŷ Ě  ϴ
 Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ Ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ
 Ϭ
 ϱ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ
 Z Ž Ƶ Ŷ Ě  ϵ
 Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ Ϭ  Ϭ ͘ Ϭ ϭ
 Ϭ
 ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ Ϭ
 Z Ž Ƶ Ŷ Ě  ϭ Ϭ
Figure 8: Distributions of model updates of Shakespeare
C.3 Privacy Parameter (ε) Distributions Across All Rounds
As mentioned before, due to the inherent privacy properties of sketches, a small amount of (Laplacian) noise
is sufficient to provide a certain level of differential privacy guarantees. In Figure 9, we visualize the histogram
of the local ε values on the MNIST dataset (with a 75× compression ratio and ε = 1) across all rounds. We
see that most of the ε values guaranteed by sketches are bounded by the input privacy requirement 0.1, and
we need to add additional Laplacian noise in a few cases to obtain a consistent privacy bound.
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Figure 9: Local ε values across all rounds when the input ε requirement is 0.1.
23
